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We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional
constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the
existence and complexity of fair allocations. We study the problem of nding an allocation that is Pareto-
optimal. While it is easy to nd an ecient allocation when the underlying graph is a path or a star, the problem
is NP-hard for many other graph topologies, even for trees of bounded pathwidth or of maximum degree 3.
We show that on a path, there are instances where no Pareto-optimal allocation satises envy-freeness up to
one good, and that it is NP-hard to decide whether such an allocation exists, even for binary valuations. We
also show that, for a path, it is NP-hard to nd a Pareto-optimal allocation that satises maximin share, but
show that a moving-knife algorithm can nd such an allocation when agents have binary valuations that have
a non-nested interval structure.
1 INTRODUCTION
In mechanism design with or without money, Pareto-optimality is a basic desideratum: if we select
an outcome that is Pareto-dominated by another, users will justiably complain. In simple seings,
it is computationally trivial to nd a Pareto-optimum (e.g., via serial dictatorship). us, it is usually
sought to be satised together with other criteria (like fairness or welfare maximisation). However,
in more complicated seings, even Pareto-optimality may be elusive.
We study the classical problem of allocating indivisible items among agents who have (typically
additive) preferences over bundles. Following a recent model of Bouveret et al. [2017], we are
interested in seings where the set of items has additional structure specied by a graph G over
the items. Agents are only interested in receiving a bundle of items that is connected in G. is
model is particularly relevant when the items have a spatial or temporal structure, for example,
if we wish to allocate land, rooms, or time slots to agents. Time slots, for instance, are naturally
ordered in a sequence, and agents will oen only value being allocated a contiguous chunk of time,
particularly when restart costs are prohibitive.
Given agents’ preferences over (connected) bundles, we wish to nd an allocation that is Pareto-
optimal (or Pareto-ecient), that is, a connected allocation such that there is no other connected
allocation which makes some agent strictly beer o while making no agent worse o. Now, in the
standard seing without connectivity constraints and with additive valuations, it is straightforward
to nd Pareto-optima: For example, we can allocate each item to a person who has the highest
valuation for it (maximising utilitarian social welfare in the process), or we can run a serial
dictatorship. However, neither of these approaches respect connectivity constraints. In fact, we
show that it is NP-hard to construct a Pareto-optimal allocation under connectivity constraints,
unless G is extremely simple.
Recent work on the allocation of indivisible items has focussed particularly on ensuring fairness.
Two well-studied fairness notions are due to Budish [2011], who introduced the maximin fair share
(MMS) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). Both concepts have natural analogues in the seing
with connectivity constraints [Bilo` et al., 2018, Bouveret et al., 2017]. An important question is
whether there is a tradeo between eciency and fairness, or whether both are simultaneously
achievable. In the seing without connectivity constraints, these notions tend to be compatible. For
example, with additive valuations, Caragiannis et al. [2016] showed that the maximum Nash welfare
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general complete tree path
PO NP-hard* poly-time NP-hard* poly-time
PO & MMS NP-hard* NP-hard* NP-hard*
PO & EF1 NP-hard poly-time† NP-hard NP-hard
Table 1. Overview of our complexity results. Hardness results marked ∗ hold under Turing reductions. The
result † refers to the pseudo-polynomial algorithm by Barman et al. [2018]. The hardness results hold even
for additive and binary valuations.
solution satises EF1 while also being Pareto-optimal. We investigate whether such tradeos exist
in the connected seing.
Contributions.
• For additive valuations, we show that one can nd a Pareto-optimum in polynomial time
when G is a path or a star.
• We show that, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that nds a Pareto-
optimum when G is a tree, even if valuations are additive and binary, and even if the
tree has bounded pathwidth, bounded diameter, or bounded maximum degree. Finding a
Pareto-optimum is also hard valuations are 2-additive and G is a path or a star.
• WhenG is a tree, there always exists an allocation which is both Pareto-optimal and satises
MMS. However, such an allocation is NP-hard to nd, even when G is a path; the problem
stays hard when weakening MMS to α-MMS for any α > 0. For a restricted class of binary
valuations (non-nested intervals), we give a polynomial-time algorithm.
• When G is a path, we give examples with binary additive valuations for which no Pareto-
optimal EF1 allocation exists, and show that it is NP-hard to decide whether such an
allocation exists.
Related Work ere is a rich body of the literature on fair division of a divisible cake into
connected pieces. Such a division satisfying envy-freeness always exists [Stromquist, 1980]; nev-
ertheless, it cannot be obtained in nite steps even when the cake is divided among three agents
[Stromquist, 2008]. In contrast, several ecient algorithms are known to yield a contiguous pro-
portional allocation; see the survey by Lindner and Rothe [2016] for more details.
e relation between eciency and fairness with connected pieces is also well-understood for
divisible items. Aumann and Dombb [2015] studied the eciency loss of fair allocations under
connectivity constraints. e papers by Bei et al. [2012] and Aumann et al. [2013] considered the
computational complexity of nding an allocation with connected pieces maximising utilitarian
social welfare. Bei et al. [2012] showed that utilitarian social welfare is inapproximable when
requiring that the allocation satisfy proportionality; however, without the proportionality require-
ment, Aumann et al. [2013] proved that there is a polynomial-time constant-factor approximation
algorithm for nding an allocation maximising utilitarian social welfare. e algorithm in [Aumann
et al., 2013] works also for indivisible items and so applies to our seing when G is a path. A paper
by Conitzer et al. [2004] considers combinatorial auctions; translated to our seing, their results
imply that one can nd a Pareto-optimal connected allocation in polynomial time, when G is a
graph of bounded treewidth and agents have unit demand: each agent has a connected demanded
bundle such that agents have positive utility if and only if they obtain a superset of the demanded
bundle.
2
In the context of division of indivisible items, Bouveret et al. [2017] formalized the model of fair
division with the extra feature that each bundle needs to be connected in the underlying item graph.
While they showed that nding an envy-free or proportional connected allocation is NP-hard even
on paths, they proved that an allocation satisfying the maximin fair share always exists and can be
found in polynomial time when the graph is acyclic; subsequently Lonc and Truszczynski [2018]
studied the computational complexity of nding an MMS allocation when the graph G is a cycle.
Independently of Bouveret et al. [2017], Suksompong [2017] considered the problem when the
items lie on a path, obtaining approximations to several fairness notions such as envy-freeness and
proportionality. e recent works of Bilo` et al. [2018] and Oh et al. [2018] study the existence of
EF1 allocations with connected pieces. ey both showed that an EF1 allocation exists when agents
have identical valuations. Bilo` et al. [2018] also proved that for up to four agents with arbitrary
monotonic valuations, an EF1 allocation connected on a path is guaranteed to exist. Finally, Aziz
et al. [2016] studied the computational complexity of nding Pareto-improvements of a given
allocation when agents have additive preferences, in the seing without connectivity constraints.
Technically, our hardness proofs use similar techniques to hardness proofs obtained by H.Aziz et al.
[2013] in the context of hedonic games.
2 PRELIMINARIES
For an integer s ∈ N, write [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. Let N = [n] be a set of agents and G = (V ,E) be
an undirected graph whose vertices are called items. A subset X of V is connected if it induces a
connected subgraph of G. We write C(V ) ⊆ 2V for the set of connected subsets of V , also called
bundles.
Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function ui : C(V ) → R over connected bundles which satises
ui (∅) = 0 and is monotonic, so X ⊆ Y implies ui (X ) 6 ui (Y ). A valuation function ui is additive if
ui (X ) = ∑v ∈X ui ({v}) for eachX ∈ C(V ). We writeui (v) = ui ({v}) for short. An additive valuation
function is binary if ui (v) ∈ {0, 1} for all v ∈ V . If an agent i has a binary valuation function, we
say that i approves item v if ui (v) = 1.
A (connected) allocation is a function pi : N → C(V ) assigning each agent a connected bundle
of items, such that each item is allocated exactly once, i.e.,
⋃
i ∈N pi (i) = V and pi (i) ∩ pi (j) = ∅ for
each pair of distinct agents i, j ∈ N . For an allocation pi and a subset N ′ of agents, we denote by
pi |N ′ the allocation restricted to N ′.
Given an allocation pi , another allocation pi ′ is a Pareto-improvement of pi if ui (pi ′(i)) > ui (pi (i))
for all i ∈ N and uj (pi ′(j)) > uj (pi (j)) for some j ∈ N . We say that a connected allocation pi is
Pareto-optimal (or Pareto-ecient, or PO for short) if there is no connected allocation that is a
Pareto-improvement of pi . e utilitarian social welfare of an allocation pi is
∑
i ∈N ui (pi (i)). It is easy
to see that a connected allocation which maximizes utilitarian social welfare among connected
allocations is Pareto-optimal.
A connected allocation satises EF1 [Bilo` et al., 2018, Oh et al., 2018] if for any pair of agents
i, j ∈ N , eitherui (pi (i)) > ui (pi (j)) or there is an itemv ∈ pi (j) such that pi (j)\{v} remains connected
and ui (pi (i)) > ui (pi (j) \ {v}). us, whenever i envies the bundle of agent j , then the envy vanishes
if we remove one outer item from the envied bundle.
Let Πn(G) denote the set of partitions ofV into n connected bundles of the graphG . e maximin
fair share of an agent i ∈ N is
mmsi = max(P1, ...,Pn )∈Πn (G)
min
j ∈[n]
ui (Pj ).
A connected allocation pi is an MMS allocation if ui (pi (i)) > mmsi for each agent i ∈ N . Bouveret
et al. [2017] show that if G is a tree, an MMS allocation exists. Note that this denition of the
3
MMS value varies with the graph G, and may be lower than the standard MMS values where the
maximisation is taken over all partitions, with no connectivity constraints.
Finally we introduce some graph-theoretic terminology. Given a graph G = (V ,E) and a subset
X ⊆ V of vertices, we denote by G \ X the subgraph of G induced by V \ X . e diameter of
G is the maximum distance between any pair of vertices. For two paths P1 = (a1,a2, . . . ,as )
and P2 = (b1,b2, . . . ,bt ), we dene the concatenation P1P2 of P1 and P2 as follows: P1P2 :=
(a1,a2, . . . ,as ,b1,b2, . . . ,bt ), where there is a new edge between as and b1. e concatenation
of a nite sequence of paths P1, P2, . . . , Pk can be dened inductively.
3 FINDING SOME PARETO-OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
We start by considering the problem of producing some Pareto-optimal allocation, without impos-
ing any additional constraints on the quality of this allocation. When there are no connectivity
requirements (equivalently, when G is a complete graph) and valuations are additive, this problem
is trivial: Simply allocate each item v separately to an agent i who has a highest valuation ui (v) for
v . e resulting allocation maximizes utilitarian social welfare and is thus Pareto-optimal. When G
is not complete, this procedure can produce disconnected bundles. We could try to give all items to
a single agent (which satises our constraints provided thatG is connected), but the result need not
be Pareto-optimal. Is it still possible to nd a Pareto-optimal allocation for specic graph topologies
in polynomial time?
Paths and Stars
For very simple graphs and additive valuations, the answer is positive. Our rst algorithm works
when G is a path. e algorithm identies an agent i with a nonzero valuation for the item at the
le end of the path G, and then allocates all items to i , except for any items at the right end of the
path which i values at 0. We then recursively call the same algorithm to decide on how to allocate
the remaining items.
Theorem 3.1. When G is a path, and with additive valuations, a Pareto-optimal allocation can be
found in polynomial time.
Proof. e path G is given by V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vm} where {vj ,vj+1} ∈ E for each j ∈ [m − 1].
For a subset V ′ of V , we denote by minV ′ the vertex of minimum index in V ′.
We design a recursive algorithm A that takes as input a subset N ′ of agents, a subpath G ′ =
(V ′,E ′) ofG , and a valuation prole (ui )i ∈N ′ , and returns a Pareto-optimal allocation of the items in
V ′ to the agents in N ′. Without loss of generality, we may assume that there is an agent who likes
the le-most vertex of G ′, i.e., ui (minV ′) > 0 for some i ∈ N ′, since otherwise we can arbitrarily
allocate that item later without aecting Pareto-optimality.
If |N ′ | = 1, then the algorithm allocates all items V ′ to the single agent. Suppose that |N ′ | > 1.
e algorithm rst nds an agent i who has positive value for minV ′; it then allocates to i a minimal
connected bundle Vi ⊆ V ′ containing all items in V ′ to which i assigns positive utility (so that
ui (Vi ) = ui (V ′)). To decide on the allocation of the remaining items, we apply A to the reduced
instance (N ′ \ {i},G ′ \Vi , (ui′)i′∈N ′\{i }).
We will prove by induction on |N ′ | that the allocation produced by A is Pareto-optimal. is is
clearly true when |N ′ | = 1. Suppose that A returns a Pareto-optimal allocation when |N ′ | = k − 1;
we will prove it for |N ′ | = k . Let pi be the allocation returned by A, where A chose agent i and
allocated the bundle Vi before making a recursive call. Assume for a contradiction that there is a
Pareto-improvement pi ′ of pi . us, in particular, ui (pi ′(i)) > ui (pi (i)). Hence, by the algorithm’s
choice of the bundle Vi , we must have Vi ⊆ pi ′(i) and ui (pi ′(i)) = ui (pi (i)). Hence, there must be an
agent j ′ dierent from i who receives strictly higher value in pi ′ than in pi .
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Now, sinceG \pi ′(i) is a subgraph ofG \Vi , the allocation pi ′ |N ′\{i } is an allocation for the instance
I ′ = (N ′ \ {i},G ′ \Vi , (ui′)i′∈N ′\{i }). Also, we have
• uj (pi ′(j)) > uj (pi (j)) for all agents j ∈ N ′ \ {i}; and
• uj′(pi ′(j ′)) > uj′(pi (j ′)) for some j ′ ∈ N ′ \ {i}.
us, pi ′ |N ′\{i } is a Pareto-improvement of the allocation pi |N ′\{i } . But pi |N ′\{i } is the allocation
returned by A for the instance I ′, contradicting the inductive hypothesis that A returns Pareto-
optimal allocations for |N ′ | = k − 1. 
Another graph type for which we can nd a Pareto-optimum is a star. In fact, we can eciently
calculate an allocation maximizing utilitarian social welfare. Note that when G is a star, at most
one agent can receive two or more items. is allows us to translate welfare maximization into a
bipartite matching instance.
Theorem 3.2. When G is a star, and valuations are additive, a Pareto-optimal allocation can be
found in polynomial time.
Proof. We give an algorithm to nd an allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare.
Let G be a star with center vertex c and m − 1 leaves. We start by guessing an agent i ∈ N who
receives the item c . By connectedness, every other agent can receive at most one (leaf) item. To
allocate the leaf items, we construct a weighted bipartite graph Hi with bipartition (N ′,V \ {c})
where N ′ consists of agents j ∈ N \ {i} together withm − 1 copies i1, i2, . . . , im−1 of agent i . (ese
copies represent ‘slots’ in i’s bundle.) Each edge of form {j,v} for j ∈ N \ {i} has weight uj (v) and
each edge of form {ik ,v} has weight ui (v).
Observe that each connected allocation in which i obtains c can be identied with a matching in
Hi : Every leaf object is either matched with the agent receiving it, or is matched with some copy ik
of i if the object is part of i’s bundle. Note that utilitarian social welfare of this allocation equals
the total weight of the matching. Since one can nd a maximum-weight matching in a bipartite
graph in polynomial time [see, e.g., Korte and Vygen, 2006], we can nd an allocation of maximum
utilitarian social welfare eciently. 
We have shown that nding a Pareto-optimum is easy for paths and for stars. An interesting
open problem is whether the problem is also easy for caterpillars, a class of graphs containing both
paths and stars. One might be able to combine the approaches of eorems 3.1 and 3.2 to handle
them, but the details are dicult. Note that caterplliars are precisely the graphs of pathwidth 1; we
discuss a negative result about graphs of pathwidth 2 below. Another open problem is whether
nding a Pareto-optimum is easy when G is a cycle.
Hardness Results
For more general classes of graphs, the news is less positive. We show that, unless P = NP, there is
no polynomial-time algorithm which produces a Pareto-optimal allocation when G is an arbitrary
tree even for binary valuations. Notably, this result implies that it is NP-hard to nd allocations
maximizing any type of social welfare (utilitarian, leximin, Nash) when G is a tree, since such
allocations are also Pareto-optimal.
To obtain our hardness result, we rst consider a more general problem which is easier to handle,
namely the case where G is a forest. Since a Pareto-optimum always exists, we cannot employ the
standard approach of showing that a decision problem is NP-hard via many-one reductions; instead
we will show (using a Turing reduction) that a polynomial-time algorithm producing a connected
Pareto-optimal allocation could be used to solve an NP-complete problem in polynomial time.
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Theorem 3.3. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal
connected allocation when G is a union of vertex-disjoint paths of size 3, even if valuations are binary
and additive.
Proof. We give a Turing reduction from Exact-3-Cover (X3C). Recall that an instance of X3C
is given by a set of elements X = {x1,x2, . . . ,x3r } and a family S = {S1, . . . , Ss } of three-element
subsets of X ; it is a ‘yes’-instance if and only if there is an exact cover S′ ⊆ S with |S′ | = r
and
⋃
S ∈S′ S = X . For a set S ∈ S, order the three elements of S in some canonical way (e.g.,
alphabetically) and write S1, S2, S3 for the elements in that order.
Given an instance (X ,S) of X3C, for each S ∈ S, construct a path PS on three verticesvS,1,vS,2,vS,3.
Let G =
⋃
S ∈S PS . For each element x ∈ X , we introduce an agent ix with uix (vS, j ) = 1 i S j = x ,
and uix (vS, j ) = 0 otherwise. us, agent ix approves all instances of x . We also introduce s − r
dummy agents d1, . . . ,ds−r who approve every item, so udk (vS, j ) = 1 for all j,k, S . Note that for
each agent ix , a highest-value connected bundle has value 1, while a highest-value bundle for a
dummy agent dk a highest-value connected bundle has value 3.
Suppose we had an algorithm A which nds a Pareto-optimal allocation. We show how to use
A to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimal
allocation pi . We claim that the X3C instance (X ,S) has a solution i
uix (pi (ix )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
udk (pi (dk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
(3.1)
Since (3.1) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence
our problem is NP-hard.
Suppose pi satises condition (3.1). We then construct a solution to the instance of X3C. For each
k ∈ [s − r ], since udk (pi (dk )) = 3, we must have pi (dk ) = PS for some S ∈ S. Let S′ = {S ∈ S :
pi (dk ) , PS for all k ∈ [s − r ]}. en S′ is a solution: Clearly |S′ | = r ; further, for every x ∈ X , we
have that pi (ix ) ∈ PS for some S ∈ S, and since uix (pi (ix )) = 1 by (3.1), this implies that x ∈ S . us,⋃
S ∈S′ S = X . Hence, S′ is a solution to the X3C instance (X ,S).
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S′ to the instance of X3C, but suppose for a contradiction
that pi fails condition (3.1). Dene the following allocation pi ∗: For each x ∈ X , identify a set S ∈ S′
and an index j ∈ [3] such that S j = x and set pi ∗(ix ) = {vS, j }; next, write S \ S′ = {S ′1, . . . , S ′s−r }
and set pi ∗(dk ) = {vS ′k ,1,vS ′k ,2,vS ′k ,3} for each k ∈ [s − r ]. en pi ∗ satises (3.1). Since pi fails (3.1),
the allocation pi ∗ Pareto-dominates pi , contradicting that pi is Pareto-optimal. Hence, pi satises
(3.1), as desired. 
From this result, it immediately follows (for forests) that it is (weakly) NP-hard under Turing
reductions to decide whether a given allocation is Pareto-optimal: if we could decide this in
polynomial time, we could use such an algorithm to construct a Pareto-improvement, and by using
this algorithm repeatedly, we could nd a Pareto-optimum.
Building on the above reduction, we nd that it is also hard to nd a Pareto-ecient allocation
when G is a tree.
Theorem 3.4. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal
connected allocation when G is a tree, even if valuations are binary and additive.
Proof. To extend the reduction in the proof of eorem 3.3 to trees, we rst ‘double’ the
reduction, in making a copy of each object and a copy of each agent with the same preference as the
original agent. Specically, given an instance (X ,S) of X3C, we create the same instance as in the
proof of eorem 3.3; that is, we make a path PS = (vS,1,vS,2,vS,3) for each S ∈ S, and construct
agent ix for each x ∈ X and dummy agents d1,d2, . . . ,ds−r with the same binary valuations.
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Fig. 1. Graphs constructed in the proofs of Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 (pictured le-to-right).
In addition, we make a path PˆS of copies vˆS,1, vˆS,2, vˆS,3 of each S ∈ S. We then make a copy iˆx of
each agent ix (x ∈ X ) together with copies dˆ1, dˆ2, . . . , dˆs−r of the dummy agents. We also introduce
a new dummy item c which serves as the center of a tree; specically, we aach the center to the
middle vertex vS,2 of the path PS , and the middle vertex vˆS,2 of the path PˆS , for each S ∈ S. e
resulting graphG is a tree consisting of 2r + 2|S| paths of length 3, each aached to the vertex c by
their middle vertex. See Figure 1.
No agent has positive value for the center dummy item. Copied agents only value copied objects
and have the same valuations as the corresponding original agents, and non-copied agents only
value non-copied objects. Formally, for each element x ∈ X , each k ∈ [s − r ], and each item v ,
agents’ binary valuations are given as follows:
• uix (v) = 1 i v = vS, j and S j = x ;
• udk (v) = 1 i v = vS, j for some S, j;
• uiˆx (v) = 1 i v = vˆS, j and S j = x ;• udˆk (v) = 1 i v = vˆS, j for some S, j.
WriteNo = { ix : x ∈ X }∪{d1,d2, . . . ,ds−r } for the set of original agents, andVo = ⋃S ∈S{vS,1,vS,2,vS,3}
for the set of original items.
Suppose we had an algorithmA which nds a Pareto-optimal allocation. We show how to useA
to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimum pi .
We may suppose without loss of generality that c < pi (i) for any i ∈ No , since otherwise we can
swap the roles of the originals and the copies. We may further assume that each original agent
i ∈ No only receives original items, i.e., pi (i) ⊆ Vo , since we can move any other items from pi (i)
into other bundles without making anyone worse o. Hence, since c < pi (i), we see that pi (i) ⊆ PS
for some S ∈ S because pi (i) is connected in G. is implies that uix (pi (ix )) 6 1 for all x ∈ X and
udk (pi (dk )) 6 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
We now prove that the X3C instance has a solution i
uix (pi (ix )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
udk (pi (dk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
(3.2)
Since (3.2) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence
our problem is NP-hard.
If (3.2) holds, then the argument in the proof of eorem 3.3 applies and shows that the X3C
instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S′ ⊆ S to the X3C instance. en, as in the proof of
eorem 3.3, there is an allocation pi ∗ : No → C(Vo) of the original items to the original agents
such that uix (pi ∗(ix )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and udk (pi ∗(dk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ]. Extend pi ∗ to all
agents by dening pi ∗(jˆ) = pi (jˆ) ∩ (V \Vo) for every copied agent jˆ. It is easy to check that pi ∗ is a
connected allocation. For each copied agent jˆ, we have u jˆ (pi ∗(jˆ)) = u jˆ (pi (jˆ)), since jˆ has a valuation
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of 0 for every item in Vo . Also, for each original agent i ∈ No , we have ui (pi ∗(i)) > ui (pi (i)), since i
obtains an optimal bundle under pi ∗. It follows that if pi fails (3.2), then pi ∗ is a Pareto-improvement
of pi , contradicting that pi is Pareto-optimal. So pi satises (3.2). 
We note that the graph constructed in the above proof has pathwidth 2 and diameter 5, so
hardness holds even for trees of bounded pathwidth and bounded diameter. One can adapt our
reduction to show that hardness also holds on trees with maximum degree 3, by copying our
original reduction many times. See Figure 2 for the structure of the resulting graph.
Theorem 3.5. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal
connected allocation when G is a tree with maximum degree 3, even if valuations are binary and
additive.
Proof. We give a Turing reduction from X3C similar to eorem 3.4.
Given an instance (X ,S) of X3C, with X = {x1,x2, . . . ,x3r } and S = {S1, . . . , Ss }, we build the
following instance.
v1S1,1 v
1
S1,2 v
1
S1,3 c
1
S1
v2S1,1 v
2
S1,2 v
2
S1,3 c
2
S1
vs+1S1,1 v
s+1
S1,2 v
s+1
S1,3 c
s+1
S1
bS1
...
v1S2,1 v
1
S2,2 v
1
S2,3 c
1
S2
v2S2,1 v
2
S2,2 v
2
S2,3 c
2
S2
vs+1S2,1 v
s+1
S2,2 v
s+1
S2,3 c
s+1
S2
bS2
...
v1Ss ,1 v
1
Ss ,2 v
1
Ss ,3 c
1
Ss
v2Ss ,1 v
2
Ss ,2 v
2
Ss ,3 c
2
Ss
vs+1Ss ,1 v
s+1
Ss ,2 v
s+1
Ss ,3 c
s+1
Ss
bSs
...
· · ·
Fig. 2. Graph with maximum degree 3 constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Our set of agents will consist of s + 1 copies of the set of agents in the reduction of eorem 3.3.
So, for each f = 1, . . . , s + 1, we introduce the following agents:
N f = {ifx : x ∈ X } ∪ {d f1 , . . . ,d fs−r }
e complete set of agents is then N = N 1 ∪ · · · ∪ N s+1. We call each of the sets N f a family of
agents.
e set of items is V = B ∪C ∪⋃S ∈S⋃s+1f =1 P fS , where B = {bS : S ∈ S}, C = {c fS : S ∈ S, f ∈
[s + 1]}, and P fS = {v fS,1,v fS,2,v fS,3} for each S ∈ S and each f = 1, . . . , s + 1.
ese items are connected in a graph G that is a union of the following paths:
• e items in B are connected in a path BS1 , . . . ,BSs .
• For each S ∈ S, the items bS , c1S , . . . , cs+1S are connected in a path.
• For each S ∈ S and each f = 1, . . . , s + 1, the items c fS ,v fS,1,v fS,2,v fS,3 are connected in a
path.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of this graph. Note that G has maximum degree 3.
We next specify the agents’ binary valuations. Unless otherwise specied, each agent has valu-
ation 0 for each item. For each f = 1, . . . , s + 1, and for each x ∈ X , the agent ifx approves those
itemsv fS, j such that S
j = x . Further, for each f = 1, . . . , s + 1, agent d fk approves all itemsv
f
S, j . Note
that no agent approves item in B or in C .
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Suppose we had an algorithmA which nds a Pareto-optimal allocation. We show how to useA
to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimum pi .
ere are s items in B, and there are s + 1 families, so there is some family such that no item in B is
allocated to any family member. at is, there is some family f such that bS < pi (if ) for all S ∈ S
and all if ∈ N f . In particular, by connectedness of pi , this means that no agent in N f receives items
from two dierent “arms” of G. Write V f =
⋃
S ∈S P
f
S . We may assume that pi (if ) ⊆ V f for every
if ∈ N f , since we can move any other items from pi (i) into other bundles without making anyone
worse o. Hence, we see that pi (if ) ⊆ P fS for some S ∈ S because pi (if ) is connected in G. is
implies that ui fx (pi (i
f
x )) 6 1 for all x ∈ X and ud fk (pi (d
f
k )) 6 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
We now prove that the X3C instance has a solution i
ui fx
(pi (ifx )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
ud fk
(pi (d fk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
(3.3)
Since (3.3) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence
our problem is NP-hard.
If (3.3) holds, then the argument in the proof of eorem 3.3 applies and shows that the X3C
instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S′ ⊆ S to the X3C instance. en, as in the proof of
eorem 3.3, there is an allocation pi ∗ : N f → C(V f ) of items to the agents in family f such that
ui fx
(pi ∗(ifx )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and ud fk (pi
∗(d fk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ]. Extend pi ∗ to all agents by
dening pi ∗(j) = pi (j)∩ (V \V f ) for every agent j ∈ N \N f . It is easy to check that pi ∗ is a connected
allocation. For each agent j ∈ N \ N f , we have uj (pi ∗(j)) = uj (pi (j)), since j has a valuation of 0
for every item in V f . Also, for each agent i ∈ N f , we have ui (pi ∗(i)) > ui (pi (i)), since i obtains
an optimal bundle under pi ∗. It follows that if pi fails (3.3), then pi ∗ is a Pareto-improvement of pi ,
contradicting that pi is Pareto-optimal. So pi satises (3.3). 
In the last section, we saw positive results for paths and stars when valuations are additive. For
more general preferences over bundles, we again obtain a hardness result.
Theorem 3.6. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal
connected allocation when G is a path, when valuations are 2-additive. e problem is also hard when
G is a star and valuations are 2-additive. Both problems are also hard for dichotomous valuations
specied by a formula of propositional logic.
A valuation function ui : C(V ) → R is dichotomous if u(X ) ∈ {0, 1} for each bundle X ∈ C(V ).
(Note that this is dierent from binary additive valuations, which are dichotomous only if an agent
approves at most one item.) A (monotonic) dichotomous valuation function can be specied by a
propositional goal formula φ over the items V using only positive literals, such that ui (X ) = 1 if
and only if φ is satised by the variable assignment that sets exactly the variables in X to true. For
example, an agent with goal formula (v1 ∧v2) ∨v3 has positive utility for all bundles X ∈ C with
{v1,v2} ⊆ X or with v3 ∈ X . For more on such valuations, see Bouveret and Lang [2008].
For a set X , let B(X ) = {Y ⊆ X : 1 6 |Y | 6 2} be the collection of subsets of X (not necessarily
connected) of size 1 or 2. A valuation function ui : C(V ) → R is 2-additive if there is a function
wi : B(V ) → R such that
ui (X ) =
∑
Y ∈B(X )
wi (Y ).
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2-additive valuation functions allow agents to specify that two items vi ,vj are complements (if
wi ({vi ,vj }) > 0) or supplements (if wi ({v1,v2}) 6 0). If wi ({vi ,vj }) = 0 for all vi ,vj ∈ V , then ui
is additive.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 for a path. We give a Turing reduction from X3C similar to eo-
rem 3.3.
Given an instance (X ,S) of X3C, with X = {x1,x2, . . . ,x3r } and S = {S1, . . . , Ss }, we build
the following instance. For each S ∈ S, construct a path PS on three vertices vS,1,vS,2,vS,3. We
construct the graph G by concatenating the paths PS1 , . . . , PSs in that order. For each x ∈ X , we
write Vx = {vS, j ∈ V : S j = x}. We say that v,v ′ ∈ Vx are consecutive if v , v ′ and there is no
v ′′ ∈ Vx that appears in between v and v ′ on the path G.
For each element x ∈ X , we introduce an agent ix whose most-preferred bundles are those
that contain some item v ∈ Vx . We also introduce s − r dummy agents d1, . . . ,ds−r whose most-
preferred bundles are those which completely contain at least one path PS . ese preferences can
be implemented by 2-additive valuation functions, where
wix ({v}) = 1 for v ∈ Vx ,
wix ({v,v ′}) = −1 for consecutive v,v ′ ∈ Vx ,
wdk ({vSj ,1,vSj ,3}) = 1 for j ∈ [s],
wdk ({vSj ,1,vSj+1,3}) = −1 for j ∈ [s − 1].
Unless we explicitly specify, each agent has zero value for X ∈ B(V ). We now show that these
2-additive valuation functions correctly implement the above statements about most-preferred
bundles. For agent ix , if X ∈ C(V ) is a bundle containing no item v ∈ Vx , then uix (X ) = 0. On
the other hand, if |X ∩ Vx | = q > 1, then X contains q − 1 pairs of consecutive members of Vx
(because X is connected on the path G), and hence uix (X ) = q − (q − 1) = 1. For agent dk , let
X ∈ C(V ) be a bundle. Note that PS ⊆ X i {vS,1,vS,3} ⊆ X by connectedness ofX . us, ifX + PS
for every S ∈ S, then ui (X ) = 0. On the other hand, if X contains k paths PSj , . . . , PSj+k−1 , then
ui (X ) = k − (k − 1) = 1.
Now, suppose we have an algorithm A which, given 2-additive valuations, can nd a Pareto-
optimum on a path. We show that A can be used to decide X3C. Run A on our allocation instance
constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimal allocation pi . We claim that the X3C instance has a
solution if and only if
uix (pi (ix )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
udk (pi (dk )) = 1 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
(3.4)
If (3.4) holds, then each bundle pi (dk ) contains at least one path PS and hence a total of s −r paths
are allocated to agents d1, . . . ,ds−r . Hence the items R =
⋃
x ∈X pi (ix ) allocated to the remaining
agents are contained within at most r paths corresponding to at most r sets in S. But by (3.4),
R ∩Vx , ∅ for each x ∈ X , hence there is a collection of at most r sets from S that cover X , and so
the X3C instance has a solution.
Suppose S′ ⊆ S is a solution to the X3C instance. Dene the allocation pi ∗ like in eorem 3.3.
en pi ∗ satises (3.4). Now, if pi does not satisfy (3.4), then pi ∗ would Pareto-dominate pi , a contra-
diction. Hence pi satises (3.4).
e same proof works for dichotomous valuations, since the specication about agents’ most-
preferred bundles can be specied by propositional logic, where for each x ∈ X , agent ix ’s goal
formula is
∨
S, j :S j=x vS, j , and for each k ∈ [s − r ], agent dk ’s goal formula is
∨
s ∈[s](vSj ,1 ∧vSj ,2 ∧
vSj ,3). 
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Proof of Theorem 3.6 for a star. We give a Turing reduction from Vertex Cover, which
asks whether given an undirected graph H = (W ,E) and positive integer k , there is a vertex cover,
i.e., a subsetW ′ ⊆W of k vertices such that for each edge {w1,w2} ∈ E, eitherw1 ∈W ′ orw2 ∈W ′
[Garey and Johnson, 1979].
Given an instance (H ,k) of Vertex Cover, we take an instance with item set V = W ∪ {c},
an underlying graph G which is a star with center c , and the agent set consists of an agent i
plus dummy agents d1, . . . ,d |W |−k . Agents’ preferences are specied so that i’s most-preferred
bundles are exactly those that contain a vertex cover of G, and so that, for each j ∈ [|V | − k], dj ’s
most-preferred bundles are exactly the non-empty ones. Such preferences can be implemented by
2-additive valuation functions, where
wi ({w}) = degreeH (w) for w ∈W ,
wi ({w1,w2}) = −1 for {w1,w2} ∈ E,
wdj ({o}) = 1 for o ∈W ∪ {c},
wdj ({c,w}) = −1 for w ∈W .
Unless we explicitly specify, each agent has zero value for X ∈ B(V ). Note that, for a bundle
X ∈ C(V ), we have ui (X ) = ∑w ∈W ∩X degreeH (w) − |{e ∈ E : e ⊆ X }| = |{e ∈ E : e ∩X , ∅}|, that
is, ui (X ) is the number of edges covered by the verticesW ∩ X . Hence, ui (X ) 6 |E |, with equality
i X contains a vertex cover of H . Further, whenever X ∈ C(V ) is nonempty, sinceG is a star, either
X is a singleton and then udj (X ) = 1, or X contains c and udj (X ) = |X | − |X \ {c}| = 1. Hence, these
2-additive valuation functions correctly implement the above statements about most-preferred
bundles.
Now, suppose we have an algorithm A which, given 2-additive valuations, can nd a Pareto-
optimum on a star. We show that A can be used to decide Vertex Cover. Run A on our allocation
instance constructed above to obtain a Pareto-optimal allocation pi . We claim that H has a vertex
cover of size k if and only if
ui (pi (i)) = |E | and
udj (pi (dj )) = 1 for all j ∈ [|V | − k].
(3.5)
If (3.5) holds, thenW ′ = pi (i) ∩W is a vertex cover of H . We may assume that |W ′ | > 2, and
hence c ∈ pi (i). us, by connectivity in the star G, the bundles pi (dj ) must be empty or singletons
for each j ∈ [|V | − k]. But by (3.5), the bundles pi (dj ) are all non-empty. us, |W ′ | 6 k , and hence
there exists a vertex cover of H with size k .
SupposeW ′ ⊆W is a vertex cover of H with |W ′ | = k . Dene the allocation pi ∗ where pi ∗(i) =
W ′ ∪ {c} and pi (dj ) is a singleton leaf fromW \W ′ for each j ∈ [|V | − k]. en pi ∗ satises (3.5). If
pi does not satisfy (3.5), then pi ∗ would Pareto-dominate pi , a contradiction. Hence pi satises (3.5).
e same proof works for dichotomous valuations, since the specication about agents’ most-
preferred bundles can be specied by propositional logic, where i’s goal formula is
∧
{w1,w2 }∈E (w1∨
w2) and dj ’s goal formula is c ∨∨w ∈W w for each j ∈ [|W | − k]. 
4 PARETO-OPTIMALITY & EF1 ON PATHS
In Section 3, we were aiming to nd some Pareto-optimum, and obtained a positive result for the
important case whereG is a path. Now we aim higher, wanting to nd an ecient allocation which
is also fair, where by fairness we mean EF1.
When there are no connectivity requirements, it is known that eciency and fairness are
compatible: Caragiannis et al. [2016] showed that an allocation maximizing the Nash product of
agents’ valuations is both Pareto-optimal and EF1. While it is NP-hard to compute the Nash solution,
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Barman et al. [2018] designed a (pseudo-)polynomial-time algorithm which nds an allocation
satisfying these two properties.
In our model, unfortunately, EF1 is incompatible with Pareto-optimality, even when G is a path.
e following examples only require binary additive valuations and at most four agents. Note that
Bilo` et al. [2018] proved that an EF1 allocation always exists on a path for up to four agents.
Example 4.1. Consider an instance with four agents a1,a2,a3,b and a path with ten items
v1, . . . ,v10, and binary additive valuations as shown below.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10
a1,a2,a3 : 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
b : 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Suppose pi is a Pareto-optimal EF1 allocation. en, for each i = 1, 2, 3, because b does not envy
ai up to one good, we have {v5,v6} * pi (ai ). us, for each i = 1, 2, 3, either pi (ai ) ⊆ {v1, . . . ,v5}
(and we say ai is in group L) or pi (ai ) ⊆ {v6, . . . ,v10} (and ai is in group R). Now, a1,a2,a3 are not
all in group L, since then one of them (say a1) would receive at most 1 approved item, and there
would be a Pareto-improvement by giving the four items {v7, . . . ,v10} to a1. Similarly, a1,a2,a3
are not all in group R. Hence, wlog, two agents (say a1,a2) are in group L and one agent (say a3) is
in group R. Since pi is Pareto-optimal, we have pi (b) ⊆ {v5,v6}; if b were to obtain any other items
(which b does not approve but every other agent does approve), then we can reallocate these items
to obtain a Pareto-improvement. us, a3 obtains four approved items, but one of a1 or a2 obtains
at most two approved items, so pi is not EF1, a contradiction. 
e following alternative example shows that Pareto-optimality and EF1 conict in an even more
restricted seing, where each agent’s approval set is an interval.
Example 4.2. Consider an instance with three agents a1,a2, and b, and a path with eleven items
v1, . . . ,v11, and binary additive valuations as shown below.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11
a1,a2 : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b : 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Suppose pi is a Pareto-optimal EF1 allocation. en, for each i = 1, 2, because b does not envy ai up
to one good, we have {v4,v5} * pi (ai ). us, for each i = 1, 2, we have either pi (ai ) ⊆ {v1, . . . ,v4}
(and ai is in group L) or pi (ai ) ⊆ {v5, . . . ,v11} (and ai is in group R). Now, a1 and a2 are not both in
group L, since then there would be a Pareto-improvement by giving the six items {v6, . . . ,v11} to
a1. Also, a1 and a2 are not both in group R, since then one of them (say a1) would receive at most 3
approved items, and there would be a Pareto-improvement by giving items {v1,v2,v3} to a1 and
{v6, . . . ,v11} to a2. Hence, wlog, a1 is in group L and a2 is in group R. Since pi is Pareto-optimal,
we have pi (b) ⊆ {v4,v5}; if b were to obtain any other items, then we can reallocate these items
to a1 and a2 to obtain a Pareto-improvement. us, a1 obtains at most four approved items (since
pi (a1) ⊆ {v1, . . . ,v4}), but a2 receives at least six approved items (since {v6, . . . ,v11} ⊆ pi (a2)), so
pi is not EF1, a contradiction. 
Given that we do not have an existence guarantee, a natural question is whether it is easy to
decide whether a given instance admits a Pareto-optimal allocation satisfying EF1. Using the above
examples, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. e obvious complexity upper bound is Σp2 ; an
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open problem is whether the problem is complete for this class. A related result of de Keijzer et al.
[2009] shows that without connectivity constraints and with additive valuations, it is Σp2 -complete
to decide whether a Pareto optimal and envy-free allocation exists; see also Bouveret and Lang
[2008].
Theorem 4.3. It is NP-hard to decide whether a Pareto-optimal EF1 connected allocation exists
when G is a path, even if valuations are binary and additive.
Proof. Given an instance (X ,S) of X3C where X = {x1,x2, . . . ,x3r } and S = {S1, S2, . . . , Ss },
we again create the same instance I as in the proof of eorem 3.3. Namely, we make a path PS =
(vS,1,vS,2,vS,3) for each S ∈ S, and construct agent ix for each x ∈ X and agents d1,d2, . . . ,ds−r
with the same binary valuations:
• uix (v) = 1 i v = vS, j and S j = x ;
• udk (v) = 1 i v = vS, j for some S, j.
We write No = { ix | x ∈ X } ∪ {d1,d2, . . . ,ds−r } for the set of the original agents, and Vo =⋃
S ∈S{vS,1,vS,2,vS,3} for the set of original vertices. We will create additional items and agents as
follows; unless we explicitly specify, each original agent has zero value for the additional items.
Idk gadget: We create an empty PO and EF1 instance Idk for each agent dk (k ∈ [s − r ]). e
empty instance Idk consists of a path Pdk = (vk1 ,vk2 , . . . ,vk10) of ten vertices as depicted in Example
4.1, together with agent dk , agents a1k and a
2
k , and agent bk . Each of dk , a
1
k , and a
2
k approves the
vertices of the path except for vk5 and vk6 while bk approves vk5 and vk6 only. e agents a1k , a
2
k , and
bk do not approve the vertices outside of Pdk . See below for these valuations.
Idk : vk1 vk2 vk3 vk4 vk5 vk6 vk7 vk8 vk9 vk10
dk ,a
1
k ,a
2
k : 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
bk : 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Ix gadget: We create an empty PO and EF1 instance Ix for each agent ix (x ∈ X ). e empty
instance Ix consists of a path Px = (vx1 ,vx2 , . . . ,vx11) as in Example 4.2, together with agent ix and
agents a1x and a2x . Each ix approves the vertices vx4 and vx5 whereas agents a1x and a2x approve every
vertex on the path but does not approve any other item outside Px . See below for these valuations.
Ix : vx1 vx2 vx3 vx4 vx5 vx6 vx7 vx8 vx9 vx10 vx11
a1x ,a
2
x : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ix : 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dummies: Note that the number of connected components of the graph constructed so far is
s+3r+(s−r ) = 2s+2r . For eachh ∈ [2s+2r ], we create a dummy agent zh and a path Pzh = (vzh1 ,vzh2 )
of two dummy vertices.
Dene the following three paths by concatenating pieces constructed above:
• P1 := PS1Pz1 · · · Pzs−1PSsPzs ,
• P2 := Px1Pzs+1 · · · Pzs+3r−1Px3r Pzs+3r ,
• P3 := Pd1Pzs+3r+1 · · · Pz2s+2r−1Pds−r Pz2s+2r .
Our nal graph G is obtained by concatenating the paths P1, P2, P3 in that order.
Each dummy agent zh only approves the dummy vertices on the path Pzh . us in any EF1
allocation, none of the non-dummy agent obtains a bundle containing both of the dummy vertices.
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Correctness: We will show that there is a Pareto-optimal EF1 connected allocation if and only if
there is an exact cover. First, suppose that there is a Pareto-optimal EF1 connected allocation pi . By
EF1, each non-dummy agent cannot obtain more than one connected component of the original
graph. us, we may assume that for each agent i , zh , the bundle pi (i) is contained in some of the
non-dummy paths in which i has approved vertices, i.e.,
• for each x ∈ X , pi (ix ) ⊆ Pα for some α ∈ S(x) ∪ {x} where S(x) is the set of S ∈ S
containing x ;
• for each k ∈ [s − r ], pi (dk ) ⊆ Pα for some α ∈ S ∪ {dk };
• for each x ∈ X and j = 1, 2, pi (ajx ) ⊆ Px ;
• for each k ∈ [s − r ] and j = 1, 2, pi (ajk ) ⊆ Pdk ;• for each k ∈ [s − r ], pi (bk ) ⊆ Pdk .
Now observe that for each x ∈ X , none of the agents except for ix approve the vertices outside Px .
As we saw in Example 4.2, if pi (ix ) ⊆ Px , and pi (ajx ) ⊆ Px for each j = 1, 2, then pi would not satisfy
both Pareto-optimality and EF1. Hence, in the Pareto-optimal and EF1 allocation pi , each agent ix
receives a bundle outside of Px , namely, pi (ix ) ⊆ Pα for some α ∈ S(x). Also, to achieve EF1 and
PO allocation of the path Px among the agents a1x and a2x , we must allocate the ve consecutive
vertices of Px to one of the agents a1x and a2x , and allocate the remaining six vertices of the path to
the other. By EF1, it follows that each agent ix receives a bundle containing at least one item which
he approves.
Similarly, for each k ∈ [s − r ], none of the agents a1k , a2k , and bk approves the vertices outside of
Pdk . us, we must have pi (dk ) ⊆ Pα for some α ∈ S; otherwise, pi would not be Pareto-optimal
and EF1 as we have seen in Example 4.1. Also, by EF1, no agent other than bk can get both of the
middle two vertices vk5 and vk6 which bk approves; thus, by Pareto-optimality, each agent bk is
allocated the middle two vertices vk5 and vk6 of Pdk . us, by Pareto-optimality, one of the agents
a1k and a
2
k is allocated the rst four vertices of Pdk and the other is allocated the last four vertices
of Pdk . It follows that to bound the envy of dk up to one item, each agent dk receives a bundle
containing at least three items which he approves.
Combining the above observations, each of the original agents is allocated to some of the original
vertices and the allocation pi satises
uix (pi (ix )) > 1 for all x ∈ X and
udk (pi (dk )) > 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
(4.1)
Hence there is an exact cover as we have seen in the proof of eorem 3.3.
Conversely, suppose that there is an exact cover. en, as we proved in the proof of eorem 3.3,
there is a perfect allocation pi of the original instance satisfying the inequalities 4.1. We extend this
allocation as follows
• each dummy agent zh obtains the associated dummy vertices in Pzh ;
• for each k ∈ [s − r ], a1k receives the rst four vertices of the path Pdk , a2k receives the last
four vertices, and bk obtains the two vertices vk5 and vk6 ; and
• for each x ∈ X , a1x the rst ve vertices of the path Px , and a2x obtains the last six vertices.
e resulting allocation is Pareto-optimal since each item is allocated to an agent who approves it;
also, it can be easily seen to satisfy EF1. 
Observe that in the Examples 4.1 and 4.2, there are at least two dierent types of agents’ valuations.
One may expect that there are existence guarantees when agents have identical valuations, i.e.,
ui (X ) = ui (X ) for all bundlesX ∈ C(V ) and all i, j ∈ N . Invoking a very recent result independently
obtained by Bilo` et al. [2018] and Oh et al. [2018], we can show that this is the case for additive
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valuations: an EF1 and Pareto-optimal allocation exists on paths for agents with identical additive
valuations.
Proposition 4.4. When G is a path and agents have identical additive valuations, a connected
allocation that satises EF1 and Pareto-optimality exists and can be found eciently.
Proof. When agents have identical additive valuations, every allocation pi has the same utilitar-
ian social welfare
∑
i ∈N ui (pi (i)) =
∑
v ∈V u1(v). Hence, every allocation maximises social welfare
and is thus Pareto-optimal. Now, Bilo` et al. [2018, eorem 7.1] and Oh et al. [2018, Lemma C.2]
show that if G is a path, a connected EF1 allocation exists, which, by the above reasoning, is also
Pareto-optimal. is allocation can be found eciently since the existence results of Bilo` et al.
[2018] and Oh et al. [2018] both come with an ecient algorithm for nding an EF1 allocation. 
For identical valuations that are not additive, Pareto-optimality and EF1 are again incompatible on
a path. e following example uses two agents and four items, and subadditive valuations.
Example 4.5 (PO and EF1 may be incompatible for identical but non-additive valuations). We give
an example with identical non-additive valuations, for which no Pareto-optimal allocation is EF1.
ere are four items a,b, c,d arranged on a path, and two agents with the following valuations:
X u(X ) X u(X )
∅ 0 {a,b} 2
{a} 2 {b, c} 3
{b} 2 {c,d} 3
{c} 2 {a,b, c} 3
{d} 1 {b, c,d} 4
{a,b, c,d} 4
en:
• allocation {{a,b, c,d}} is not EF1;
• allocation {{a,b, c}, {d}} is not EF1;
• allocation {{a,b}, {c,d}} is Pareto-dominated by {{a}, {b, c,d}};
• allocation {{a}, {b, c,d}} is not EF1.
One can check that these valuations are subadditive. 
5 PARETO-OPTIMALITY & MMS ON PATHS
In the previous section, we saw that deciding the existence of an allocation that is Pareto-ecient
and satises EF1 is computationally hard, even ifG is a path, and there are examples where no such
allocation exists. Part of the reason is that envy-freeness notions and Pareto-optimality are not
natural companions: it is easy to construct examples where some allocation is envy-free, yet by
Pareto-improving the allocation, we introduce envy.
An alternative notion of fairness avoids this problem: Pareto-improving upon an MMS allocation
preserves the MMS property, because MMS only species a lower bound on agents’ utilities.
Bouveret et al. [2017] showed that if G is a tree, then an MMS allocation always exists (and can be
found eciently). Hence, if G is a tree, there is an allocation that is both Pareto-optimal and MMS:
take an MMS allocation, and repeatedly nd Pareto-improvements until reaching a Pareto-optimum,
which must still satisfy the MMS property.
While existence is guaranteed, it is unclear whether we can nd an allocation satisfying both
properties in polynomial time. Certainly, by the negative result of eorem 3.4, this is not possible
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when G is an arbitrary tree. What about the case when G is a path? e answer is also negative: a
Pareto-optimal MMS allocation cannot be found eciently.
Theorem 5.1. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which nds a Pareto-optimal
MMS allocation when G is a path, even if valuations are binary and additive.
Proof. We again give a Turing reduction from X3C, building on the reduction of eorem 3.3.
Suppose we are given an instance (X ,S) of X3C, where X = {x1,x2, . . . ,x3r } and S = {S1, . . . , Ss }.
Construct the paths PS1 , PS2 , . . . , PSs and agents ix for each x ∈ X and dk for each k ∈ [s − r ] with
binary utilities like in the proof of eorem 3.3. We write No = { ix : x ∈ X } ∪ {d1,d2, . . . ,ds−r }
and Vo =
⋃
S ∈S{vS,1,vS,2,vS,3} for the sets of agents and items introduced so far.
In addition, for each k ∈ [s], we construct a path Bk of 2r + 2s new vertices b1k ,b2k , . . . ,b2r+2sk . e
graph G for our problem is obtained by concatenating these paths in the order P1,B1, . . . , Ps ,Bs .
Finally, for each k ∈ [s], we introduce an agent zk who approves exactly the vertices on Bk . e
agents in No do not approve any of the items in B1, . . . ,Bs .
Note that, in total, there are 3r + (s − r )+ s = 2r + 2s agents. Since each agent zk approves 2r + 2s
vertices, each agent zk has positive MMS value, namely mmszk = 1.
Suppose we had an algorithm A which nds a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation on a path. We
show how to use A to solve X3C. Run A on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a
Pareto-optimum pi which satises MMS. en, for each k ∈ [s], the agent zk receives at least one
vertex from Bk since pi is MMS. It follows that no agent i ∈ N0 can receive items from two dierent
paths PSj and PSk , j < k , since these paths are separated by Bj . us, for each i ∈ N0, there is some
j ∈ [s] with pi (i) ⊆ Bj−1 ∪ PSj ∪ Bj . By suitably reallocating items that agent i does not approve, we
can in fact assume that pi (i) ⊆ PSj for some j ∈ [s]. is implies that uix (pi (ix )) 6 1 for all x ∈ X
and udk (pi (dk )) 6 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
We now prove that the X3C instance has a solution i
uix (pi (ix )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and
udk (pi (dk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ].
(5.1)
Since (5.1) is easy to check, this equivalence implies that A can be used to solve X3C, and hence
our problem is NP-hard.
If (5.1) holds, then the argument in the proof of eorem 3.3 applies and shows that the X3C
instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose there is a solution S′ ⊆ S to the X3C instance. en, as in the proof of
eorem 3.3, there is an allocation pi ∗ : No → C(Vo) of the original items to the original agents
such that uix (pi ∗(ix )) = 1 for all x ∈ X and udk (pi ∗(dk )) = 3 for all k ∈ [s − r ]. Extend pi ∗ to all
agents by dening pi ∗(zk ) = Bk for each k ∈ [s]. It is easy to check that pi ∗ is a connected allocation.
For each k ∈ [s], we have uzk (zk ) = uzk (pi (zk )), since zk receives all approved items in pi ∗ Also, for
each original agent i ∈ No , we have ui (pi ∗(i)) > ui (pi (i)), since i obtains an optimal bundle under
pi ∗. It follows that if pi fails (5.1), then pi ∗ is a Pareto-improvement of pi , contradicting that pi is
Pareto-optimal. So pi satises (5.1). 
For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an allocation pi is α-MMS if ui (pi (i)) > α · mmsi for all i ∈ N . e
above proof implies that we cannot in polynomial time nd a Pareto-optimal allocation that is
α-MMS, for any α > 0. e reduction can also easily be adapted to the case when G is a cycle.
Next, we show that whenG is a path, we can nd a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation in polynomial
time for a restricted class of valuations. We assume that agents’ valuations are binary and additive,
and for each voter, the set of approved vertices forms an interval of the path G, and nally these
intervals are non-nested. Formally, given binary and additive valuations and an agent i ∈ N , we
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let A(i) = {v ∈ V : ui (v) = 1} be the set of vertices which i approves. For a path P = (1, 2, . . . ,m),
we say that binary valuations are non-nested on the path if for each i ∈ N , A(i) is connected on
the path, and there is no pair of agents i, j ∈ N with minA(i) < minA(j) and maxA(j) < maxA(i).
e corresponding restriction captures, for instance, when several groups wish to book the same
conference venue; each group species a period of contiguous dates of (almost) equal length that
are suitable for them. We show that when valuations have this form, there is a polynomial-time
algorithm which yields a Pareto-optimal MMS allocation. e algorithm is an adaptation of the
moving-knife algorithm of Bouveret et al. [2017].
We rst observe that if agent i’s approval interval appears before j’ approval interval and these
intervals intersect with each other, then the value of the le bundle exceeds i’s maximin fair share
before it exceeds j’s maximin fair share. For j,k ∈ [m] with j 6 k , we write [j,k] = {j, j + 1, . . . ,k}.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that G is a path P = (1, 2, . . . ,m) and valuations are binary and additive. Let
i, j ∈ N be a pair of distinct agents such that A(i) and A(j) are connected on the path, minA(i) 6
minA(j), and maxA(i) 6 maxA(j). If agent j values [1,x] at least as highly as her maximin fair
share and minA(j) 6 x + 1, then i values [1,x] at least as highly as her maximin fair share.
Proof. If the interval [1,x] contains i’s approval interval, i.e., maxA(i) 6 x , then i’s value for
[1,x] is at least her maximin fair share. us suppose that the last vertex of i’s approval interval
appears aer or at x + 1 (i.e., x + 1 6 maxA(i)). Assume for a contradiction that agent i does
not value [1,x] at least as highly as her maximin fair share, i.e., ui ([1,x]) < mmsi . Since the
minA(j) 6 x + 1, we have minA(i) 6 minA(j) 6 x + 1; also, since x + 1 6 maxA(i), we have that
x + 1 6 maxA(i) 6 maxA(j). By the contiguity, it follows that both i and j approves the item x + 1.
Now let s denote the number of vertices approved by i in [1,x]. Similarly, let t denote the number
of vertices approved by j in [1,x]. By the above argument, note that s > t . Since [1,x] does not
guarantee i’s maximin fair share, i has value more than (n − 1)(s + 1) for [x + 1,m], i.e.,
|[x ,m] ∩A(i)| > (n − 1)(s + 1).
Otherwise, i’s maximin fair share would be at most s . However, since j’s value for [1,x] is at least
his maximin fair share, j has value at most (n − 1)(t + 1) for [x + 1,m], i.e.,
|[x ,m] ∩A(j)| 6 (n − 1)(t + 1).
Otherwise, j’s maximin fair share would be more than t . Now recall that s > t , which implies
(n−1)(s+1) > (n−1)(t +1). is means that agent i has strictly more approved vertices in [x +1,m]
than agent j, namely, x + 1 6 maxA(j) < maxA(i), a contradiction. 
i
j
A(i) x
A(j)
Fig. 3. Illustration of non-nested approval intervals.
We are now ready to show that a moving-knife algorithm can be used to produce a Pareto-optimal
MMS allocation. Intuitively, that following algorithm sequentially creates a connected bundle for
i1, i2, and so on, such that we add one vertex to the bundle of i j as long as this bundle does not
exceed the maximin fair share of the agent i j+1. By doing so, we can ensure that each agent receives
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a connected bundle of at least maximin fair share and every item has been allocated to an agent
who approves of it if there is any. Hence, the resulting allocation maximizes the utilitarian social
welfare and so is Pareto-optimal.
In what follows, we denote by mmsi (I ′) the maximin fair share of i for the instance I ′ with
subpath P ′, agent set N ′, and valuations (ui )i ∈N ′ . Namely,
mmsi (I ′) = max(A1, ...,An′ )∈Πn′ (P ′) minj ∈[n′]ui (Aj ).
for each i ∈ N ′ where n′ = |N ′ |.
Theorem 5.3. When the graph G is a path and valuations are binary and additive given by non-
nested intervals on the path, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that nds an MMS connected
allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare.
Proof. We design a recursive algorithm A that takes as input the instance I ′ with a subset N ′
of agents, a subpath P ′ = (1, 2, . . . ,m), and a valuation prole (ui )i ∈N ′ , and returns a utilitarian
optimal MMS allocation of the items to the agents in N ′. We write n′ := |N ′ |. Assume without loss
of generality that that every item is approved by some agent, and every agent approves some item.
If n′ = 1, then the algorithm allocates all the items to the single agent. Suppose that n′ > 1.
(1) Order agents as i1, i2, . . . , in′ so that minA(ik ) 6 minA(ik+1) and if minA(ik ) = minA(ik+1)
then maxA(ik ) 6 maxA(ik+1). Hence A(i1) ends earliest, i.e. maxA(i1) 6 maxA(ik ) for all
k > 1.
(2) Set x to the minimum such that ui1 ([1,x]) > mmsi1 (I ′).
• If [1,x] ∩A(i2) , ∅, allocate [1,x] to agent i1.
• If [1,x] ∩A(i2) = ∅, allocate [1,minA(i2) − 1] to agent i1.
(3) Recurse, by relabeling items so that the le-most item is again called 1.
See Figures 4 for an illustration. Note that the reduced instance still remains non-nested since
otherwise there would be a pair of agents i, j in the original instance with minA(i) < minA(j) and
maxA(j) < maxA(i).
One can compute the maximin fair share of each agent in polynomial time if the graph is a path
[Bouveret et al., 2017]; thus it is immediate that A runs in polynomial time. Now we will prove by
induction on the number of agents the following:
• agent i ∈ N ′ receives a connected bundle of value at least mmsi (I ′); and
• every approved item v (i.e., some i ∈ N ′ approves v) has been allocated to some agent in
N ′ approving v .
e claim is immediate for |N ′ | = 1. Suppose that the claim holds for |N ′ | = ` − 1; we will
prove it for |N ′ | = `. Let pi denote the allocation returned by the algorithm. To show that every
approved item has been allocated to some player, observe rst that agent i1 has positive value for
every approved item in pi (i1). Indeed, by construction of the algorithm, agent i1 does not receive
any item y that appears aer maxA(i1); and no agent ik with k > 1 approves item y that appears
before minA(i1). Also, there is no item y < pi (i1) only approved by agent i1: If there is such an item
y < pi (i1), then it means that x < y but y ∈ A(i1) \A(i2), and thereby
x < y < minA(i2) 6 maxA(i1).
Hence, [1,x] ∩A(i2) = ∅ and y ∈ pi (i1), a contradiction. Applying the induction hypothesis, every
approved item not in pi (i1) is allocated to some player in N ′ \ {i1} who approves that item.
Now it remains to prove that every agent receives a bundle of value at least his maximin fair
share. Clearly, agent i1 receives a bundle of value at least mmsi1 (I ′). Take any ik with k > 1. Let
I ′′ denote the reduced instance aer the bundle for i1 is removed. It is clear that mmsik (I ′′) >
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i1
i2
A(i1)
pi (i1)
A(i2)
i1
i2
pi (i1)
A(i1)
A(i2)
Fig. 4. Illustration of the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
mmsik (I ′) if ik approves no vertex in pi (i1) or mmsik (I ′) = 0. So suppose otherwise, i.e., agent ik
approves at least one vertex in pi (i1) and has positive maximin fair share mmsik (I ′) > 0. Now let
X1,X2, . . . ,Xn′ be a partition of P ′ into connected bundles witnessing mmsik (I ′), i.e., mmsik (I ′) =
minh∈[n′] uik (Xh). Without loss of generality, we assume that the le most item 1 belongs to X1.
Since uik (X1) > mmsik (I ′) > 0, ik approves at least one vertex in X1, thereby implying that the
initial vertex of ik ’s approval interval appears before or at the right-most vertex of X1. Since
minA(i2) 6 minA(ik ), it means that [1,x]∩A(i2) , ∅ and hence pi (i1) = [1,x]. By Lemma 5.2, since
ik values X1 at least as highly as her maximin fair share at I ′, i1 evaluates X1 at least as valuable
as her maximin fair share at I ′. Now due to the minimality of x , we get that [1,x] ⊆ X1. Hence,
it follows that ((X1 \ X ) ∪ X2,X3, . . . ,X |N ′ |) is a partition certifying that mmsik (I ′′) > mmsik (I ′).
us, by the induction hypothesis, every ik with k > j receives a connected bundle of value at least
mmsik (I ′). 
We give an example where the algorithm used in eorem 5.3 fails to nd a PO and MMS allocation
when agents’ preferences are given by approval intervals that do not obey the non-nestedness
condition.
Example 5.4 (Example where the moving-knife algorithm fails for nested intervals). Consider an
instance with two agents and ve vertices on a path, with binary additive valuations as below.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
Alice: 1 1 1 1 1
Bob: 0 1 1 0 0
Applying the algorithm in eorem 5.3, we give {v1,v2} to Alice and {v3,v4,v5} to Bob. is
allocation is Pareto-dominated by the allocation giving {v1,v2,v3} to Bob and {v4,v5} to Alice.
Noticeably, this example does not admit an MMS allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social
welfare: the unique utilitarian optimal allocation is the allocation giving everything to Alice, which
clearly violates the MMS requirement for Bob. 
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have studied the computational complexity of nding Pareto-ecient outcomes, in
the natural seing where we need to allocate indivisible items into connected bundles. We showed
that although nding a Pareto-optimal allocation is easy for some topologies, this does not extend
to general trees. Further, we proved that when imposing additional fairness requirements, nding a
Pareto-optimum becomes NP-hard even when the underlying item graph is a path. We have also
seen that a Pareto-optimal EF1 allocation may not exist with the contiguity requirement while such
an allocation always exists when these requirements are ignored.
While we have focused on the divisions of goods, studying an allocation of chores with graph-
connectivity constraints is an interesting future direction. In particular, one may ask what graph
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structures give positive results in terms of both existence and computational complexity. Finally,
several recent papers studied the fair division problem over social networks [Abebe et al., 2017,
Bei et al., 2017, Bredereck et al., 2018, Gourve´s et al., 2017] where a social network describes the
envy relation between agents. A particular focus is laid on local envy-freeness, requiring that each
agent does not envy the bundle of her neighbours. Although our graph describes a relationship
among items rather than agents, it would be interesting to analyze ‘intermediate’ cases. For example,
suppose that we only focus on the envy between a pair of agents who are allocated adjacent bundles
in G, what graph structure guarantees the existence of a locally envy-free and Pareto-optimal
allocation?
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